The federal role in education finance is commonly seen as compensatory. The federal government gives large sums of money to low-income schools and school districts through programs such as Title 1. Yet, this view of federal aid is based solely on direct educational expenditures. The federal government and state governments also support schools through tax deductions and tax credits for educational expenditures. These policies tend to benefit higher-income districts. Without incorporating tax policies into our assessment of federal contributions to schools we will vastly underestimate the federal role and vastly overestimate the progressive nature of federal aid to schools. As an example, the deductibility of state and local taxes from the federal income tax is a federal contribution to schools. An individual in the 28% federal income tax bracket, who pays US$1000 in deductible state and local taxes for schools may deduct the US$1000 from the taxable income and reduce his/her federal tax bill by US$280. Thus, of the US$1000 going to schools, the federal government pays US$280 and the individual pays US$720. This paper estimates the extent and distribution of this subsidy and asks how the price incentives created by the deductibility affect the distribution of education spending across school districts. We compare both the size and progressivity of this 'indirect' federal subsidy to direct federal aid to schools (Title 1, for example). We find that the deductability more than doubles the federal contribution to schools and is so regressive that, even in combination with direct federal programs, more federal funds go to high-income than to low-income school districts. 
Introduction
The federal role in education finance is commonly seen as compensatory. The federal government gives large sums of money to low-income schools and school districts through programs such as Title 1. Yet, this view of federal aid is based solely on direct educational expenditures. The federal government and state governments also support schools through tax deductions and tax credits for educational expenditures. These policies tend to benefit higher-income districts. Without incorporating tax policies into our assessment of federal contributions to schools we will vastly underestimate the federal role and vastly overestimate the progressive nature of federal aid to schools.
Tax deductions and tax credits for educational expenditures are proliferating across states. Taxpayers in Arizona receive up to a US$200 credit for fees paid to public schools for extracurricular activities. In Iowa parents can claim a tax credit of US$250 or 25% of the first US$1000 they pay to an eligible education provider for each dependent in grades K-12. In Minnesota taxpayers can deduct up to US$1625 for elementary students or US$2500 for secondary students for tuition, textbooks, transportation, academic summer camps, and summer school (Education Commission of the States, 1999) . Nationally, President Bush has proposed a US$5000 tax deduction for tuition at private schools. These policies utilize the tax system for funding elementary and secondary education. The outlays would not appear as educational expenditures by state or federal sources in typical figures, such as those in the Digest of Education Statistics 1 . Yet, given a base of the tax revenue that would be collected without the deductions and credits, these tax-expenditure policies utilize state and federal funds for schools.
Tax expenditures for schools come not only from policies that directly target taxpayers' educational spending but also from the deductibility of state and local taxes. Public elementary and secondary education in the United States is funded largely through property and income taxes at the state and local level 2 . Taxpayers that itemize can deduct these taxes from their federal income tax 3 . Direct federal aid to schools has consistently provided less than 10% of total funding; yet, this deduction creates a federal subsidy to education, which not only provides funds to individuals who itemize, but also creates a price incentive for those individuals to spend more on public education. The deduction lowers the price of taxes at the local level and thus may result in an increased demand for school spending. In what follows, we estimate the extent and distribution of this subsidy and ask how the price incentives created by the deductibility affect the distribution of education spending across school districts. We compare both the size and progressivity of this indirect federal subsidy to direct federal aid to districts.
The state and local tax deduction for education is equivalent to a subsidy from the federal government. Consider an individual who is in the 28% federal income tax bracket and who pays US$1000 in deductible state and local taxes for schools. By itemizing and deducting the US$1000 from the taxable income, this individual reduces his/her federal tax bill by US$280. Thus, of the US$1000 going to schools, the government pays US$280 and the individual pays US$720.
Not all individuals receive the same subsidy from the federal government. First, not all taxpayers itemize. Tax-1 According to the 1999 Digest of Education Statistics (US Department of Education, 1999), in 1996-97 48.0% of school revenues came from state sources, 45.4% from local sources, and 6.6% from federal sources.
2 Property and income taxes constitute 31.4% of total state tax revenue and 89.4% of total local tax revenue.
3 Federal income tax deductions amounted to US$1062.5 billion in 1997. Of these, US$620 billion (approx. 60%) were itemized deductions. payers are given the choice of itemizing or taking a standard deduction. For many taxpayers the sum of their deductions will not be as great as their standard deduction. These individuals are likely to choose the standard deduction. Others may choose the standard deduction simply because they are unaware that they could do better by itemizing or because this benefit is not worth the administrative costs. These individuals receive no federal reimbursement from the deductibility of the education taxes. Because itemizers have, on average, higher incomes than non-itemizers, the requirement of itemizing to receive aid results in a regressive distribution of this federal subsidy 4 . Moreover, not all individuals are in the same federal tax bracket. An individual who is in the 15% federal income tax bracket will only receive US$150 for US$1000 paid in deductible state and local taxes for schools. That is, marginal income tax rates are synonymous with implicit subsidy rates (Feldstein & Metcalf, 1987) . The progressivity of the federal income tax adds to the regressivity of this policy. Rock (1984) provides empirical evidence of the regressive influence of the deductibility of state and local taxes.
The level of spending on schools and the types of taxes used to fund this spending also may be affected by the policy. Deductibility reduces the price of an additional dollar for schools raised by deductible taxes. It is thus likely to increase both the demand for spending among those that itemize and the use of deductible taxes to fund this spending. As the price of public spending decreases, taxpayers will substitute public spending for private consumption (Craig & Inman, 1982; Zimmerman, 1983; Noto & Zimmerman, 1984) . As the price of a dollar of spending from income and property taxes decreases, the share of funds raised by these taxes will increase (Inman, 1985) .
In the study most similar to ours, Barro (1983) estimates federal expenditures resulting from the deductibility of taxes for school spending by state and compares this to direct federal aid. As expected, he finds indirect aid to be substantial, 7.3 billion dollars in 1980 5 He estimates that this aid is more than the direct federal aid in 11 states. When the subsidy is considered, the federal share of education spending almost doubles from 9.3% to 18.2%. While Barro's paper indicates the importance of the federal deduction, it ignores the distributive impact of this deduction by addressing only the distribution of spending across states. Much variation in overall spending and in direct federal aid exists among districts within states. In this paper, we use a district-level analysis to capture this variation and to better assess the distributive impact of the federal deductions.
The organization of the paper is as following: Section 2 explains the data and methodology used to quantify both the indirect federal aid resulting from the deductibility of education taxes and the implicit price reductions resulting from this aid. Section 3 uses the probability of itemizing by income group and the distribution of income groups within each school district in the USA to estimate federal aid to each district. Section 4 uses estimates of the price elasticity of demand for education spending from the literature to assess the consequences of the implicit price reduction for spending levels and for the equity of spending across districts. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Data and methodology
We combine information contained in three databases to estimate the federal income tax deductions: the School District Data Book (SDDB), the IRS Statistics of Income-Public Use Tax File for the tax year of 1989, and the 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS). The SDDB provides detailed information about public education revenue sources, residential property values, and household incomes in each school district in the USA in 1989. The IRS data provides individual-level information on adjusted gross income, itemizing and marginal federal income tax rates. PUMS allows us to link household income to individual income and to estimate average household income for households in each SDDB income category. The following describes these calculations step by step.
We use information from the SDDB database on the number of households in each district in each of 25 income categories. We match these 25 groups to PUMS to obtain an average household income for each income group. Since PUMS gives actual income we can average the income over all individuals in each income group, to obtain an average income for that income group 6 . Using these averages, we obtain an estimate of the proportion of the total income in the district earned by each household and by households in each income category. For example, in California's Palo Alto Unified School District in 1989 households with income US$35 000-37 500 generated 6.9% of the income generated by households in the district. We calculate this percent figure for each income category in each district. We then repeat this procedure for the 25 income categories at the state level for each state. These percentages provide estimates of the proportion of public education revenue that is financed by each income segment in each district. Multiplying the education revenues from state sources and the education revenues from local sources by the respective income percent measures gives an estimate of the education revenues generated by each income group. This method is most accurate for revenues raised by single-rate personal income taxes. However, in many states local revenues are raised by the property tax. This methodology assumes that the relative household income at the local level is equivalent to relative property value at the local level in each school district. While we are assuming that higher income is associated with a higher property value within any given district, the method does not impose any specific restriction on the relationship between income and property value across districts. We consider each district separately and thus allow the ratio of income to property value to vary across districts 7 .
Residents are not the only local taxpayers. Non-residents also bear a portion of the tax burden. Ideally we would know the percent of local property that is nonresidential in each district but this information is not available for most districts. Instead, we apply state averages for the percent of commercial or industrial property to each district in the state (1987 Census of Governments, vol. 2, Taxable Property Values, 1989) 8 . We assume that owners of commercial or industrial property face a marginal tax rate of 34% (almost all did at this time) 9 and that all owners deduct their local tax payments from their federal income tax. We calculate the value of these deductions by districts but the benefits do not necessarily accrue to district residents because many owners do not reside in the district or even state of their property.
The assumption that all districts in a state have the same proportion of residential property may be problem- 7 We are not able to distinguish renters from owners. The direction of the bias caused by this omission is not clear. Renters are likely to have lower marginal tax rates and probabilities of itemizing than owners of rental property. If owners pass the value of their deductions onto renters then we will underestimate the value of the deductions to the renters. If owners do not pass on the value, then we will overestimate the value. Renters living in public housing or subsidized hours are unlikely to gain from the available deductions. Carroll and Yinger (1994) find that property tax deductions are shared approximately equally between renters and landlords. 8 We assume no agricultural property because the vast majority of education spending occurs in districts with negligible agricultural property.
9 See Rosen (1999) p. 401. atic if this proportion differs by the income of district residents. In order to assess this, we obtained data from Michigan and Texas on district-level property value distinguished by type. We found that in both cases, higher income districts tend to have a higher percent of residential property. Since the probability of itemizing and the marginal tax rate is higher for commercial and industrial property, this property substantially increases federal indirect subsidies to districts. If we underestimate commercial property in poorer districts and overestimate it in richer districts, we may overestimate the regressivity of the deductibility policy, though the owners of this property are unlikely to be poor. While we cannot solve this problem with available data, we present estimates of both the total indirect federal aid and the federal aid that comes through taxes on residential property only. The total numbers are most appropriate for estimating total federal aid to schools, but the estimates including only residential property deductions better capture the distributive consequences of this aid. In order to obtain an estimate of the federal income tax deduction resulting from education spending we need to consider not the total local and state revenues for schools, but only the state and local education revenue that are raised by taxes that are deductible from the federal income tax. Without this adjustment we would overestimate the federal income tax deductions. Table 1 shows the percent of the state and local education revenue that comes from income and property taxes, which are deductible from the federal income tax. In many states 100% of local revenue come from tax-deductible sources. In fact, in only 17 of the 50 states do property taxes account for less than 95% of local tax revenues for schools (Loeb, 2001 ). However, much less of state revenues come from these sources: 30-40% in many states. We assign the average percent of local and state education revenue that is deductible in the state to each individual school district.
We now have an estimate of state and local education revenues raised by deductible taxes that are attributable to each household in each district. In order to estimate the dollar value of the deductibility, we need to know the marginal tax rate of the household's taxpayer and the probability that this taxpayer will itemize. SDDB generates 25 categories of household income. The IRS database, used to estimate the probability of itemizing and the marginal income tax rate, generates 30 adjusted gross income categories for individuals. We have household income in one survey and individual income in another. In order to match the household income categories to the individual income categories we need a matching algorithm. PUMS data has both household and individual income and, thus, we can use PUMS to create this algorithm. With this data, we identify the highest income individual in each household and generate for each SDDB household income group the proportion of these highest income earners that fall into each IRS individual income group 10 . We use the average marginal tax rate for individuals in each of the IRS income categories to estimate the average marginal tax rate for the households 11 . Table 2 shows the proportion of taxpayers in each IRS income segment in each of the five federal tax brackets that existed in 1989 (0%, 15%, 28%, 33% and 35%). As we move to higher income groups the proportion of taxpayers in higher tax brackets increases. For example, 71.5% of the individuals with an income between US$25 000 and US$30 000 had a marginal tax rate of 15% in 1989. This percent decreases to 6.7% when the segment considered has an income between US$50 000 and US$75 000. Note that actual tax rates differ from tax rates assigned to income groups because total income differs from taxable income. We obtain an adjusted marginal tax rate for the representative taxpayer in each income group, which is the weighted average of the federal marginal tax rates paid by members in each income segment. As expected, this adjusted marginal tax rate increases with income. It has a minimum of 4.3% for incomes less than US$1000 and reaches a maximum of 34.6% for incomes greater than US$200 000. We use these adjusted federal marginal tax rates as the implicit price reductions experienced by households.
In order to estimate the value of the deductions we need measures of the probability of itemizing as well as marginal tax rates. Our analysis of the IRS Statistics of Income database of 1989 shows the expected relationship between income and the probability of itemizing: the higher the income of the taxpayer, the higher the probability of itemizing (Table 2) . Ninety-eight percent of taxpayers with incomes over US$200 000 itemized, while Ͻ5% of taxpayers with incomes ϽUS$7000 itemized. Given that the income distribution varies from state to state, the proportion of itemizers should vary by state accordingly. We find a higher proportion of taxpayers itemizes in high-income states such as New York (47.4%) than in low-income states such as Louisiana (27.5%) or Mississippi (23.8%).
Combining the probability of itemizing and the distribution of income groups across districts, we use Eq. (1) to estimate the amount of indirect aid that the federal government provides to each school district in the USA 12 For commercial and industrial property owners, we 10 Results available from the authors upon request. 11 We choose to use the highest income individual because he/she is most likely to be the homeowner, and because a household acting strategically would choose to take the deduction from the highest income individual. Note that we are assuming that individuals do not file tax returns jointly.
12 Data on Hawaii and Wyoming were not available, so they are excluded from the analysis. assume a tax rate of 34% and we estimate tax deductions using Eq. (2).
(1)
where d 1 is the value of the federal income tax deduction for the district residents, d 2 is the value of the federal income tax deduction for commercial property, P itemize,i is the probability of itemizing for income category i, MTR ADJ,i is the adjusted marginal tax rate for income category i, NCI P Proportion of district property value that is not commercial or industrial, P ID,i is the proportion of total district income generated by households in the income category, REV L is the local education revenue, D L,Tax is the proportion of the local education revenue that can be deducted, P IS,i is the proportion of the total income in the state generated by the income category in the district, REV S is the state education revenue and D S,Tax is the proportion of the state education revenue (tax) that can be deduced from the federal income tax.
Federal indirect aid
Using Eqs. (1) and (2) we calculate the total federal indirect aid to public education in 1989 to have been approximately US$20 billion. The federal indirect aid differed across states, from a low of US$14.8 million for Montana to a high of US$3 billion for New York. This high variation is due not only to the different distribution of income groups by state, but also to the number of households and students in each state. Through deductibility, the federal government provided approximately US$566 per pupil nationally in indirect aid in 1989 (Table 3 ). The average federal direct aid (Title 1, etc.) was US$276 per student, implying that the total federal aid to public education (direct plus indirect aid) was approximately US$842 per student. Indirect aid represented more than 67% of this total. Federal indirect aid was not equally important in every state. In 19 states indirect aid accounted for a smaller fraction of total federal aid than did direct aid to public education. In Alaska it accounted for only 9% of federal aid; in New Mexico, only 20.6%; and in Mississippi, only 22.4%. However in the richer states and states that rely heavily on deductible taxes, such as Massachusetts (87.2%) and New Jersey (84.1%), the indirect aid was substantially larger than the direct aid. In Vermont, indirect aid constituted more than 92% of total aid. Clearly direct federal subsidies alone do not represent the federal contribution. The proportion of school revenues that come from federal sources more than doubles when indirect subsidies are included, consistent with Barro's (1983) findings. The subsidy estimates so far have included deductions from property taxes on commercial property. This is the appropriate approach for assessing the federal government's overall contribution to public schools. However, when assessing the distribution of these subsidies, we may only want to consider that portion of the indirect subsidy that accrues to residents. Even with this restriction, federal indirect aid provides an average of US$331 per pupil, which is more than the direct federal aid of US$276 per pupil. Again the indirect subsidy is not evenly distributed across states. Vermont receives an average of US$816 per pupil and Tennessee receives an average of US$43 per pupil.
Federal aid through tax deductions was not evenly distributed across districts within states. Higher income districts received more aid. To illustrate this, Table 4 gives the results of district-level regressions of our estimates of indirect federal aid per pupil on median household income. We see that, on average, a US$10 000 increase in median income corresponds to US$160 more indirect aid per pupil. By including state fixed effects we can separate the distribution patterns within states from those between states. We see that within states the policy is also regressive with US$120 more indirect aid with each US$10 000 increase in median income. a When weighted by children in the districts the coefficients on the linear terms in the first six regressions are: 0.0136(0.0001), 0.0107(0.0001), 0.0221(0.0003), 0.0182(0.0002), Ϫ0.0096(0.0002), Ϫ0.0123(0.0002). The coefficients on the total with only linear income are 0.0040(0.0003), with no state controls and Ϫ0.0016(0.0002) with state controls. The coefficients on the linear and squared terms are Ϫ0.0155(0.0009) and 2.51e-07(1.14e-08) with no state controls and Ϫ0.0257(0.0008) and 3.03e-07(9.70e-09) with state controls.
gives the results of a bivariate regression of direct federal aid on median income. As expected, this aid is quite progressive; districts receive ca US$78 less per each additional US$10 000 of median income, US$81 less when looking within states. When we combine direct and indirect aid excluding commercial and industrial deductions, the total federal contribution to districts is regressive, US$82 additional per US$10 000 increase in median income across all districts and US$39 additional within states. Given the progressivity of direct aid, we might expect a U-shaped relationship between income and total aid, with low-income districts receiving substantial funds through programs such as Title 1 and highincome districts receiving substantial indirect aid through deductions. The introduction of median income squared into the regression of total aid, evidences this effect.
Total aid decreases with income at low-income levels and increases at high-income levels. Without state fixed effect, the minimum aid level is at US$22 100 median income; when state fixed effects are included the minimum rises to US$35 000.
To provide additional evidence on the distribution of federal funding, we compare funding sources for highincome districts (those in the top 10 percentiles in median household income) with those of low-income districts (those in the bottom 10 percentiles in median household income). On average, districts in the lowest 10 percentiles of median income received more state funds per pupil (US$2397 versus US$1818) and less local funds (US$1891 versus US$5495) than the top ten percentile districts. As expected, low-income districts received substantially more direct federal aid (US$609 versus US$141 per pupil) but substantially less indirect federal aid (US$169 versus US$791 per pupil) than highincome districts. These figures exclude estimates of federal aid through business deductions and, thus, as discussed above, may underestimate these differences by income group. Overall federal aid is regressive (US$778 for low-income districts and US$932 per pupil to highincome districts), contrary to the typical portrayal of the federal government's role in financing elementary and secondary schools.
Consequences of the implicit price reduction
The deductibility of local and state taxes not only funnels federal dollars to taxpayers, but also reduces the price of education for those who itemize and, thus, increases demand for school spending. This section analyzes the consequences that the implicit tax-price reduction has on the expenditure of each school district in the USA.
Using prior estimates of the price elasticity of demand for school spending we can estimate a change in demand resulting from the deductibility. However, we do not know whose demand determines district spending. Since taxpayers within a district vary in the extent of price break provided by deductions, we need a model of district decision making in order to translate demand changes into spending changes. We use two alternative methodologies. The first one estimates the demand change using the adjusted federal marginal tax rate of the household with the median household income. The second uses the average of the adjusted marginal tax rates paid by all the households in each school district.
These two methods -the median voter model and the average voter model -provide estimates of the price reduction induced by the tax deductibility. Using these price reductions, a price-elasticity for education expenditures, and the current expenditure level for each district, we calculate the positive demand shock induced by this tax mechanism and the expenditure level that we would observe without it
where Q 1 is the quantity demanded without allowed deductions; Q 2 is the quantity demanded with the allowed deductions; n X, Px is the price elasticity of demand for school spending; and %⌬P is the percent change in price induced by the deductibility
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. We 13 Here we assume that districts decide local contributions to schools with the knowledge of state aid to their district. It is possible that the process is more iterative with states acting on knowledge of district contribution. choose -0.3 for the elasticity based on results of previous research [see Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, & Shapiro (1982) for a review]. This produces a positive demand shock of 1.4% nationally using the median voter model and 3.1% nationally, using the average voter model. The difference between the two models likely arises because both the marginal tax rate and the probability of itemizing increase with income. The price change, which is the product of the marginal tax rate and the probability of itemizing, increases more than linearly with income. The average per pupil expenditure under the current policy was US$5385. If this policy were not in place, expenditures would have been US$5312 per pupil, if the median voter model were correct, or US$5221 per pupil, if the average voter model were correct. The increases are greater in the richer states. For example, Connecticut averaged a 4.7 (2.9)% increase by the average (median) voter model and New Jersey averaged a 4.7 (2.8)% increase by the average (median) voter model 14 .
The change in demand induced by the tax policy not only increased the total demand for school spending, but also increased the disparities in school spending across districts. We again compare the lowest and highest 10% of districts ranked by median household income. The policy increased demand for both groups; however, it increased demand for the high-income districts by substantially more than it increased demand for the lower income districts. The average (median) voter models give a change of 2.2 (0.4)% for the low-income districts and 5.2 (3.4)% for the high-income districts. In 1989, on average, districts with the lowest ten% of income received US$4897 per pupil, while districts with the highest income received US$7454 per pupil. If this policy were not in place these figures would be US$4792 (US$4877) and US$7086 (US$7209), respectively. Tax deductions increased spending at the bottom of the distribution by US$105 (US$20), but increased spending at the top of the distribution by US$706 (US$583) per pupil 15 .
14 We can use this approach to estimate the proportion of the deductions that are used for schools. A back of the envelope of calculation of this uses the average district-median household income of US$28 554 with an adjusted marginal tax rate of 18.5% and a probability of itemizing of 35.7%. The price decrease for this average district then would be 6.6%. With a price elasticity of Ϫ0.3, this implies an increase in demand of 1.98%. Our estimate of the average demand for spending with no deduction policy was US$5312 in the average district. The demand increase would be 1.98% of this or US$105. The average deduction valued without commercial and industrial property taxes was US$331 per pupil, so less than one-third of the deduction value was used for to schools.
15 These estimates of the demand effect of the federal policy are based on the assumption that local taxpayers have control over local spending. However, that is not the case in many states today and it was not the case in 1989.
Conclusion
President Bush's recently announced education plan calls for a US$5000 tax deduction for tuition at private schools. Such plans blur the line between tax policy and subsidies. Fully understanding the distribution of burden for school funding requires incorporating tax policies and the indirect aid that these policies provide. This paper estimates the effect of the deductibility of tax expenditures for schools on the distribution of school spending. The estimates are imperfect. As an example, we have not addressed the substitution of deductible and non-deductible taxes. Has the deductibility led to the increased use of deductible taxes at the state and local level? Certainly at the state level there are suggestions that taxes are substitutable. For instance, Michigan in the mid-1990s rejected an increase in the state income tax in favor of an increase in the sales tax, even though in so doing they lost substantial federal aid from deductibility. Courant and Loeb (1997) estimate this loss at US$380 billion in 1995. At the local level there is less evidence that there are feasible alternatives to the property tax given that the overwhelming majority of locally raised revenues come from the property tax (Loeb, 2001) .
Because taxpayer information is not available at the district level, the analysis uses many proxies. However, imperfect as they are, our estimates provide evidence that the federal government plays a far larger role in school spending than direct federal aid indicates. This role is not primarily compensatory. The Federal Government gives large sums to high-income districts through tax deductions. While state-level school-finance policies that give substantial dollars to low-income districts largely mitigate federal contributions, the use of the tax system to fund schools masks the true distribution of taxes paid and educational spending received by different communities. Whether the benefits of the deductions, namely the increases in revenues from local and state sources, are worth their distributional impact is a question worthy of debate.
